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ABSTRACT
Named Data Networking (NDN) secures network commu-
nications by requiring all data packets to be signed when
produced. This requirement necessitates efficient and usable
mechanisms to handle NDN certificate issuance and revo-
cation, making these supporting mechanisms essential for
NDN operations. In this paper, we first investigate and clarify
core concepts related to NDN certificates and security design
in general, and then present the model of NDN certificate
management and its desired properties. We proceed with the
design of a specific realization of NDN’s certificate manage-
ment, NDNCERT, evaluate it using a formal security analysis,
and discuss the challenges in designing, implementing, and
deploying the system, to share our experiences with other
NDN security protocol development efforts.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In public-key cryptography, public key certificates assert the
binding between a public key and a communicating iden-
tity. As such, certificate management for issuance, storage,
delivery, renewal, and revocation, is a critical task. Named
Data Networking (NDN) [29] architecture embeds the use
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of the public-key cryptography into its design to ensure the
integrity and authenticity of the communication. Specifi-
cally, all data packets are named and signed at the time of
production, securely binding the name and the content of
the packet. Following the security principle of “least priv-
ilege” [22], NDN promotes the use of hierarchies of sign-
ing keys, each with limited-scope (e.g., “/foo/bar1/KEY/..”,
“/foo/bar2/KEY/..”, ... keys to operate only within “/foo
/bar1” and “/foo/bar2” namespace respectively) to mini-
mize potential damage in case any private keys are compro-
mised. Therefore, a usable, flexible, and scalable certificate
management is among the foremost important steps in real-
izing NDN security and NDN architecture in general.
In this paper, we clarify several core concepts that are
tightly related to the design of NDN security protocols (§4),
which are often misunderstood/misinterpreted (even among
ourselves) due to the influence by today’s security practices
(§2). We then provide a systematic study of the new require-
ments and the challenges for certificate management in NDN
(§5).
Guided by the identified requirements, we propose NDN-
CERT, an automated certificate management system for cer-
tificate issuance and revocation in NDN (§6). To ensure the
security of the protocol and the usability of the implementa-
tion on different hardware platforms, we performed a basic
formal analysis of the proposed protocol and overhead study
of our prototype implementations. We end the paper by shar-
ing identified challenges and lessons learned from realizing
and deploying an earlier version of NDNCERT [3], which
has been running over the NDN Testbed for more than a
year.
The contributions of our work are threefold: (i) a clarifi-
cation of several core concepts in designing NDN security
protocols; (ii) a systematic study of the new requirements
and the challenges of certificate management in NDN; and
(iii) the design and development of NDNCERT. In addition
to a specific protocol design, we share our experiences in
addressing the challenges we met in realizing and deploying
the system. We hope our experiences can be of more value
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contributing to the research and development of security
solutions in general, and to the NDN rollout in particular.
2 THE USE AND MANAGEMENT OF
CERTIFICATES IN TODAY’S INTERNET
Certificate issuance and management are essential in any
systems that deploy cryptographic protection. The Internet
today relies on TLS to secure communications. Other ap-
plication systems such as SSH [27] and GPG [7, 11] also
adopted the use of digital certificates. Below we use TLS cer-
tificate system as a representative of today’s widely deployed
certificate management system.
Until recently, most TLS certificates have been issued by
a relatively small number of commercial Certificate Authori-
ties (CAs) [1]. Commercial CA services came into existence in
the mid-90s to meet the need of cryptographic protection for
the emerging e-commerce applications at the time. Pragmatic
solutions were also developed to install the self-signed cer-
tificates of these CAs into end-users’ devices as trust anchors,
largely through side channels (e.g., web browser installation
and updates), and behind the back of users. Rapid growth
for certificate services also leads to the rise of hierarchical
relationships between CA providers, for example with CA-1
issues a certificate to CA-2 which in turn issues certificates
to end-users. By and large one could view CAs in the TLS
certificate management as trust anchors1, whose certificates
get installed into user devices.
The research community has identified several longstand-
ing issues with today’s CA practice, which we summarize
below.
Authenticity vs. Trust. There are different views regard-
ing the meaning of a certificate CP issued to party P by a
CA. Most commercial CA providers hold the view that if P
holds a certificate CP issued by them (especially if it is an
Extended Validation/EV certificate), then CP certifies both
P ’s identify and its trustworthiness. Another view, shared
by LetsEncrypt, today’s de facto largest CA issuing free-of-
charge certificates using automated means [6, 16], believes
that a valid TLS certificate only certifies the authenticity of
party P ’s identity, but not P ’s trustworthiness. For example,
a phishing website can successfully obtain a valid TLS cer-
tificate from a CA, commercial, or otherwise, as long as it
owns a domain name and has an available web server [8].
Externality and Trust. Today’s CAs are external and thus
agnostic to the communicating parties who need to establish
trustworthy relations [24]. Anyone can get a certificate, n
unrelated parties P1, P2 · · · Pn possessing a certificate each is
unrelated to whether they trust each other. The fact that the
1In practice, a trust anchor can run multiple CAs whose certificates are
derived from the trust anchor certificate.
trust anchors of these certificates are decided by yet another
external entity (e.g., browser vendors) behind the back of
end users further argues that certificates serve the purpose
of authentication at best, not trust relations.
Constraints. In today’s practice, a certificate is issued to a
site (a company, or at least a DNS name owner), and the cer-
tificate owner is not allowed to issue certificates for its own
sub-namespaces, making it difficult to support the the princi-
ple of “minimal privilege". Another practice is setting a pro-
longed certificate lifetime: generally a few months as a mini-
mum, and often one year or even longer–this is especially
true in case of manually processed certificates. Compounded
with the coarse certificate granularity, a long lifetime reduces
certificates’ resiliency against brute force usage-analysis at-
tacks.
3 NAMES AND CERTIFICATES IN NDN
NDN [29] changes the Internet communication model from
IP’s pushing packets to destination addresses to fetching
data by names. It also promotes the use of application-layer
namespace in network communication, which is a sharp de-
parture from today’s protocol stack design, where each layer
defines its own identifier space (e.g. IP uses IP addresses,
transport protocols use port numbers and sequence num-
bers). Naming datawith application-layer namespace enables
NDN to utilize the semantically meaningful names to sim-
plify and streamline the use of cryptographic data protection
as explained in [32].
To secure data directly, producers cryptographically sign
data packets, binding their names with the payload (Figure 1).
When a consumer C fetches a Data packet PD , it verifies the
signature in PD to check its authenticity and integrity. C
uses the key locator, which contains signing key information,
carried in PD to retrieve the corresponding public key certifi-
cate.C considers PD trustworthy only if the whole certificate
chain is valid and anchored at a certificate specified by C’s
trust policies [28].
Data Producer Data Consumer 
Unsigned
Named Content
Signed
Data Packet
Use the proper 
key to sign Data
NDN Network
Trusted
Named Content
Interest packet
Use the proper 
key to verify Data
Signed
Data Packet
Figure 1: Signature Verification in NDN
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3.1 Names and Configurations
AnNDN entity requires four pieces of information to become
an active participant in an NDN environment, i.e., being able
to publish and fetch data [32]. They are (i) the name assigned
to the entity, (ii) a certificate that binds the entity’s name
and its public key, (iii) a trust anchor which is represented
as a certificate, and (iv) trust policies [28].
While pure consumers only need (iii) and (iv) to partici-
pate, entities in general are most likely to act in both capac-
ities (e.g., at least being a producer for local management
tasks), therefore all four pieces should be considered essen-
tial. Furthermore, NDN utilizes the fact that everything in
the cyberspace can be encoded as a named piece of data2.
Therefore certificates and trust policies can simply be en-
coded as named, secured data packets that can be fetched as
any other content.
3.2 NDN Certificate
An NDN certificate binds an entity’s name and its public key.
It is a piece of Data signed by the issuer, and its name follows
the naming convention below.
/<identity-name>/KEY/[key-id]/[info]/[version]3
For example, if a user Alice is assigned a name “/example
/alice” and has a public key “/example/alice/KEY/123”, a
corresponding certificate issued by the issuer ca-1 should
be “/example/alice/KEY/123/ca-1/456”. This certificate al-
lows Alice to produce verifiable Data packets using the cer-
tified key. Once consumers fetch her data, they can authen-
ticate Alice’s public key through the certificate and verifies
data. Alice can also further assign sub-namespaces (e.g. /ex-
ample/alice/guest/) to other entities and issue corresponding
certificates signed by her certified key.
One can easily define various trust relations between cer-
tificates because of the semantic meanings embedded in their
names. For example, adding a component “guest” to an en-
tity’s name Eд , one can easily define trust policies to make
Eд ’s certificate represent a lower privilege level, compared
to other certificates with a component “member”. In this way,
one can define policies based on the certificates’ names to
express different levels of trustworthiness [28]. As another
example in vehicular networking, geolocation information
can be embedded into the name of a certificate issued to a ve-
hicle passing a specific location as follows: “/vehicles/geo:
34n-118w/id:123/KEY/456/ca-1/789”, certifying that a ve-
hicle 123 physically appeared at the location.
2Here we use “naming” broadly to cover various identifiers.
3<> represents one or more name components while [] refer to one name
component.
3.3 Certificate Validation
Cryptographic verification of the data signature requires the
whole certificate chain from the signer’s certificate to the
trust anchor certificate specified in the trust schema. To pass
the verification, all the involved certificates must satisfy the
following requirements.
(1) All certificates in the certificate chain must be available.
In other words, the verifier must be able to fetch them if
they are not already cached locally.
(2) All certificates in the chain must be valid, i.e. neither
expired nor revoked.
Once these two requirements are met, the integrity of the
data is verified. §6.5 and §6.1 will describe in detail the cer-
tificate availability and revocation mechanism provided by
NDNCERT.
4 RELATIONS BETWEEN NAMES,
CERTIFICATE, AND TRUST
Before moving onto the NDN certificate management design,
we would like to first clarify several core concepts that relate
to each other: (1) the relation between name assignments and
certificate management; (2) the relation between a certificate
holder and a certificate issuer; (3) the relation between a
certificate issuer and a trust anchor; and (4) the relation
between authentication and trust.
4.1 Name Assignment and Certificate
Management
As we discussed in §3, NDN utilizes application-layer names
in both network layer communication and security protec-
tion solutions. Name assignment needs to be done out-of-
band due to two reasons: (i) assigning a name to an entity E
requires the authentication of E, but E does not have an iden-
tity yet; and (ii) names are generally semantically meaningful
and thus name assignments need to be done by entities who
understand the semantics.
It is possible to issue a certificate to a named entity E at the
time of E’s name assignment. However, certificate issuance
requires in-band operations: E must be running, generate
its own key pairs, and communicate with the issuer to get
a certificate. This creates challenges if one has to combine
this in-band step with the out-of-band name assignment.
Compared with name assignment, the certificate issuance
can be done online through a standard process (e.g., NDN-
CERT proposed in this paper) once E obtains its name and
trust anchor by some out-of-band means, and certificates
also require continued management after issuance.
As such, this paper focuses on the design of a usable NDN
certificate management protocol, leaving the name manage-
ment to the namespace owner. In the implementation of
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Figure 2: The laptop issues a certificate to the IoT de-
vice as a certificate issuer rather than a trust anchor
NDNCERT, we also provide mechanisms to facilitate name
assignments whenever feasible in different scenarios as dis-
cussed in §8.5.
4.2 Allowing A Certificate Holder to Issue
Certificates
NDN utilizes application-layer’s structured, semantically
meaningful names to allow users and applications to de-
fine a rich set of trust policies, and to support least privilege
principles in cryptographic key usage. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to allow a certificate holder to issue derived certificates
for the sub-namespace under its own name. Such structured
delegation provides a foundation for flexible privilege separa-
tion and limiting the scope of individual keys, based on name
relationship among entities captured by the trust policies
(e.g., trust schema [28])
We use an example to illustrate the advantage from al-
lowing a certificate holder to issue certificates: assume a
professor Alice is issued a certificate by the campus. She
wants to let her new IoT device (e.g., a Raspberry Pi) produce
some experimental data for her students. Assuming all enti-
ties on campus are configured with the campus key as the
trust anchor, to generate data that can be verified by her stu-
dents, Alice could either (i) apply for another certificate for
her device directly from the campus certificate issuer ,or (ii)
copy the existing certificate and private key from her laptop
to the device. The first approach leads to scaling concerns:
the campus key would be used to issue too many certificates,
and when the key changes, it may be impossible to re-issue
new certificates to all the devices on campus. The second one
introduces great security risks for Alice’s laptop. Allowing
Alice to derive another certificate directly from her existing
certificate (Figure 2) provides a simple and scalable solution,
supports the least privilege security principle.
4.3 Certificate Issuer , Trust Anchor
A trust anchor represents an administrative domain (e.g.,
a home, a campus) and its certificate must be configured,
generally via a secure out-of-band means, into all entities
within the domain. If a campus certificate “/campus1/KEY
/self-signed/123” is configured as a trust anchor certificate,
an issuer’s certificates like “/campus1/alice/KEY/...” can
be trusted by other users on the campus if: (i) their certificate
chain terminates at “/campus1/KEY/self-signed/123”, and
(ii) their trust policies consider such chain valid with respect
to signer-signee name relations. Although Alice can serve
as a certificate issuer for her IoT devices (Figure 2), Alice’s
certificate is not the “root of trust” on the campus.
Generally speaking, although a certificate issuer must be
trusted by its requesters, the issuer may, or may not, be a
trust anchor in the system. Recall that trust anchors need
to be configured via secure out-of-band means and changes
to trust anchors can be expensive to handle; therefore, one
must be careful in deciding trust anchors.
4.4 Authentication , Trust
Authentication is required in establishing trust relations,
but it does not equal to trust. Authentication confirms the
identity of a party while trust decides what actions an au-
thenticated party is trusted to perform. NDN security design
develops separatemechanisms to support authentication and
trust: certificate verification checks the authenticity of each
entity, and trust schemas are used to determine the allowed
actions for each authenticated entity, as explained in [28, 32].
For example, a smart home system can issue different
certificates for a home member and a guest. Its trust policy
would allow only a home member to unlock the smart door
while allowing both the member and the guest to control
the house light. In this case, even though both parties are
authenticated, the trust on each is separately determined by
one’s identity and policy.
5 NDN CERTIFICATE MANAGEMENT
MODEL
In this section, we formally model the certificate manage-
ment system in NDN, summarize the assumptions, and define
the desired properties of such a system.
5.1 System Model
A certificate management procedure involves three main
logically separated parties: the certificate requester, the cer-
tificate issuer, and the name authority.
• Certificate Requester: an entity that requests a certifi-
cate to prove its ownership of a namespace and bind its
public key to the namespace.
• Certificate Issuer: an entity that validates and processes
certificate issuance/renewal/revocation requests under the
associated namespace.
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• NameAuthority: an entity that manages an NDN names-
pace and determine whether a requester is an owner or is
allowed to own a particular sub namespace.
5.2 Assumptions
Our model of the NDN certificate management makes the
following assumptions:
(1) A certificate issuer is available for the corresponding cer-
tificate requesters. Note that not all issuers are assumed
to be available to all requesters.
(2) The trust anchor is pre-installed by an out-of-band way,
and therefore a requester can authenticate an issuer.
(3) There is a secure channel between the name authority
and the certificate issuer, and thus they can cooperate
to verify the legitimacy of requests. For example, the
certificate issuer can access a name authority’s database
of short term secure codes.
5.3 Desired Properties
We define the desired properties of a certificate management
system in NDN as follows.
Usability. NDN’s certificate management system should
provide an easy to use application for certificate issuance,
renewal, and revocation. Specifically, its design should mini-
mize the necessity of manual operations and configurations.
Flexibility. The certificate management should be adaptable
to different application scenarios because (i) each system
can have different identity verification means; (ii) secure
channel between certificate issuers and name authorities can
be realized in various forms; (iii) name authorities can have
diverse certificate naming conventions.
System Security. As an essential part of network security,
the certificate management process itself should be secured.
• Communication security. The system must ensure authen-
ticity, integrity, and confidentiality of communication be-
tween an issuer and a requester; in addition, forward se-
crecy, resistance to replay attacks and man-in-the-middle
attacks should also be provided.
• Issuer security. While an issuer should maintain its avail-
ability to legitimate requesters, its exposure to potential
compromise must be minimized, e.g., by security hard-
ware [5, 13] ormulti-factor authentication (MFA) to protect
an important issuer private key. Note that issuer security
will not be covered by the design proposed in this paper
and is left for specific applications.
Availability. Issued certificates must be highly available to
data consumers who need to verify Data packets. If there
exists any revoked certificates, the availability of revocation
records must be realized as well.
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Figure 3: An Overview of NDNCERT
Scalability. The certificate management system must be
scalable to process certificate operation requests in large and
complicated systems.
Transparency. Since issuer’s correctness directly impacts
the security of the whole system, the certificate issuance,
renewal, and revocation should generate immutable and pub-
licly auditable logs [12].
6 DESIGN OF NDNCERT
Based on the system model and desired properties, we pro-
pose the design of NDNCERT (Figure 3) to allow ease-of-use
certificate issuance, renewal, and revocation. In addition,
we also present how flexibility, transparency and certificate
availability can be realized, and NDNCERT’s security con-
siderations.
In NDNCERT, a certificate requester communicates with
a certificate issuer over a public (insecure) network for cer-
tificate issuance, renewal, and revocation. The certificate
issuer can also contact the name authority through a pre-
established secured channel in either in-bind or out-of-band
manner.
In addition to a requester, issuer, and name authority, NDN-
CERT also assumes the existence of NDN repositories (NDN
repo) that support immutable logging. To provide immutable
logging, the distributed ledger technologies (DLT) or data
storage system with strict access control can be executed
over NDN repos. We do not assume a specific implementa-
tion of the immutable logging because it is out of the paper’s
scope.
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6.1 Certificate Issuance, Renewal, and
Revocation
NDNCERT provides a usable means to issue, renew, and
revoke a certificate.
Certificate Issuance. In the certificate issuance procedure,
the issuer verifies the following information from the re-
questers, assuming that a requester has already obtained a
name for the certificate request from the name authority.
(1) The ownership of the private key whose public key will
be certified by the issuer.
(2) The legitimate identity to own a certificate of a requested
name.
The ownership of the private key is verified by asking the
requester to use the private key to sign the request with a
nonce or timestamp (to prevent replay attacks). Then, the
requester’s identity information is checked through an iden-
tity verification challenge and with the help of the name au-
thority. NDNCERT supports both out-of-band and in-band
challenges. For example, for an out-of-band challenge, the
requester can physically meet and obtain the secret from the
name authority, while for an in-band case, the requester can
prove its identity by showing the already owned certificate
from another issuer trusted by the current issuer.
After the requester proves both ownership of the private
key and the legitimate identity, the issuer will sign the certifi-
cate for the requester. The certificate can be exported to NDN
repositories for high availability and the issuance record can
optionally be appended to immutable logging systems for
auditing purposes.
Certificate renewal can be considered to be a special case
where the identity verification challenges require an owner-
ship proof of a previous key; thus, in principle, NDNCERT
does not separate certificate renewal from issuance. Since
the certificate renewal process can be automated with NDN-
CERT, using short-lived certificates is recommended.
Certificate revocation. As mentioned, NDNCERT recom-
mends using and renewing short-lived certificates to mini-
mize the use of explicit certificate revocations, thus reducing
system complexity and status checking overhead for issuers,
requesters, and consumers. At a high-level, the idea resem-
bles OCSP stapling [23]; however, instead of using a special
OCSP response, NDNCERT simplifies the process by letting
issuers directly issue short-lived certificates. When a certifi-
cate is supposed to be revoked, the issuer can simply stop
renewing the certificate.
When desired, NDNCERT can realize an explicit certificate
revocation. Following the security practices, the following
three types of entities should be able to issue a revocation:
(1) The issuer of the certificate.
(2) The owner of the namespace. In normal cases, this refers
to the certificate or the corresponding private key holder;
however, when the private key is compromised, the owner
of the namespace can prove its identity to the issuer and
ask the issuer to generate a revocation.
(3) The holder of the corresponding private key. Normally,
this refers to the namespace owner; when the key is
compromised, the attacker can also access the private
key. As such, the private key holder can directly use the
private key to sign a revocation.
A revocation, which is also a Data packet, should be signed
by the private key of either the certificate to be revoked or
its issuer. Importantly, the revocation message should be
appended to the immutable logging system available to the
whole system.
6.2 Flexibility
In order to allow different systems to configure NDNCERT
for their own application scenario, NDNCERT makes the
identity verification a separate, extendable module, allowing
issuer operator to add/remove/update verification challenge
means in a plug-and-play manner.
To be more specific, NDNCERT provides a general frame-
work to carry on different identity verification challenges
and defines a set of unified interfaces that allow developers
to develop new challenges. In addition, we also provided sev-
eral default identity verification challenges, including proof
of the ownership of a PIN code, an email address, a private
key, and an existing certificate issued by another issuer.
When the naming assignment policy can be represented
by a set of rules, NDNCERT also allow the name authority
to pass these rules into the issuer via a callback function,
simplifying the communication between the name authority
and the certificate issuer.
6.3 Scalability
In NDNCERT, the preferred mechanism to improve scalabil-
ity from a system perspective is hierarchical delegation of
certificate management. To be more specific, instead of let-
ting a single centralized issuer manage all the certificates for
the entire system, multiple issuers under the root namespace
can be established. This not only brings better scalability in
terms of each issuer’s overhead and management complex-
ity, but also allows a finer granularity of name assignment,
privilege separation, and trust relationship as discussed in
§4.2. In §7.3, our trial deployment on the NDN testbed shows
a live example of such delegation.
On Certificate Management in Named Data Networking Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
6.4 Transparency
Transparency through immutable logging is crucial for the
certificate management system as it provides accountabil-
ity and auditability (e.g., to detect intrusion), and improves
availability of important records.
In NDNCERT, certificates issuance, renewal, and revoca-
tion records are immutably recorded. Immutability can be
realized in several ways, e.g., immutable database, distributed
ledger technologies (DLT). For example, following the con-
cept of DLedger [31], records can be linked together with
their names and hash value; when multiple parties are in-
volved, records generated from different parties can interlock
each other for better security.
6.5 Certificate Storage and Availability
NDNCERT does not specify how certificate availability should
be realized. We present several mechanisms that can be ap-
plied.
• Holder-side certificate availability: Each certificate holder
should serve their own certificates. In addition, when the
certificate holder is also a producer, it can also provide
the data and certificates [19] together to ensure certificate
availability.
• NDN repo: NDN repo, dedicated network-layer storage,
can improve the availability of NDN certificates, e.g., when
certificate holder are offline. For example, a certificate
issuer can export the certificate data packet to an NDN
repo when it issues a certificate.
• In-network cache: Since a certificate is an NDN data packet,
it can be cached at network routers. In addition to the
passive network cache [2], new cache policies can be de-
veloped to improve the cache priority of certificate Data
packets.
• Immutable logging: The immutable logging system can
also be used to keep records for original certificate Data
packets.
6.6 Security Considerations
To secure the communication between the requester and the
issuer, NDNCERT implements the following mechanisms.
First, to ensure the authenticity and integrity of the com-
munication, every Interest packets from the requester are
signed by the private key of the requested certificate, and ev-
ery Data packets from the issuer are signed with the issuer’s
private key.
Second, to achieve confidentiality and forward secrecy of
the communication, the requester and the issuer will jointly
create a shared secret key (with Elliptic Curve Diffie Hell-
man (ECDH) [18] and HMAC-based Key Derivation Function
(HKDF) [15]) to encrypt the subsequent communications
(with AES GCM [21] encryption scheme).
Notation Explanation
R Certificate requester
I Certificate issuer
Nonce Randomly picked nonce in Interest packets.
PubKey A public key.
PrvKey A private key.
дx , дy
x, y are random numbers and д is a generator in an
elliptic curve group for Diffie Hellman protocol.
Request ID
A random identifier selected by the issuer to identify
the session.
SIGN (d, k ) The digital signature signed by key k over the data d .
ENC(d, k ) The ciphertext of d encrypted with key k .
KDF (d ) The key derived from d with a cryptographicallysecure key derivation function.
Secret
Sensitive data exchanged in the identity verification
challenge.
Table 1: Notations
Packet
Exchange
Modeled Payload
(including information carried in the Name)
R→ I, “NEW”
Interest
Nonce1, PubKeyR , дx
SIGN((Nonce1, PubKeyR, дx ), PrvKeyR )
R← I, “NEW”
Data
Nonce1, Request ID , дy
SIGN((Nonce1, Request ID, дy ), PrvKeyI )
R→ I,
“CHALLENGE”
Interest
Nonce2, Request ID ,
C1 = ENC(Secret1, KDF(дxy )),
SIGN((Nonce2, Request ID, C1), PrvKeyR )
R← I,
“CHALLENGE”
Data
Nonce2, Request ID ,
C2 = ENC(Secret2, KDF(дxy )),
SIGN((Nonce2, Request ID, C2), PrvKeyI )
Table 2: Modeled NDNCERT Protocol in CPSA
7 IMPLEMENTATION, EVALUATION,
AND TRIAL DEPLOYMENT
7.1 Implementation
We have implemented NDNCERT4 in C++ for general pur-
poses and TypeScript for modern web scenarios. We provide
both the library for developers to integrate NDNCERT pro-
tocols into their specific applications and also command-line
tools that can directly be used. Our implementation supports
storage for request states using both memory and persistent
storage (e.g., SQLite database). It can also seamlessly work
with existing NDN repo implementations [14] to improve
certificate availability.
As specified in [4], the core NDNCERT protocol is mainly
implemented into two main steps: NEW step and CHAL-
LENGE step. Table 1 and table 2 give an symbolic represen-
tation of these two steps.
NEW step. The requester first sends an Interest packet car-
rying the requested namespace, the requested validity period
4The codebase and protocol specification will be published in the final
version of the paper
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of the certificate, the public key to be certified, and a signa-
ture generated by the corresponding private key. In reply,
the issuer sends a Data packet carrying RequestID which is
randomly picked to identify the request instance and a list
of identity verification challenges for the requester to pick.
Note that both Interest and Data also contain the public in-
formation used for the ECDH key agreement and are signed
with the timestamp and nonce to prevent replay attack.
CHALLENGE step. There can be multiple round trips for
the requester to finish the challenge. In each round trip, the
requester sends an Interest packet carrying the selected chal-
lenge and the information used in the challenge, and the
issuer replies with further requirements or status informa-
tion specified by the selected challenge. All the parameters
carried by the Interest and Data will be encrypted using the
key negotiated at the end of NEW step. Similar as in NEW
step, all the packets are signed by the sender and verified by
the receiver.
Besides NEW and CHALLENGE, our implementation also
supports other optional steps and supporting features. For
example, we use Realtime Data Retrieval (RDR) protocol [17]
for requesters to discovery new versions of issuer’s profile
and download it. In addition, NDNCERT allows redirection,
which allows an issuer to redirect its requesters to trusted sub
namespace issuers, providing better scalability and flexibility.
7.2 Evaluation
Formal Analysis of NDNCERT Protocol. We formally
analyze the latest NDNCERT protocol with CPSA [10, 25],
which generates the shapes of all possible executions to
compromise the tested protocol. In modeling the NDNCERT
protocol into the CPSA, we generalize an identity verification
challenge to be the private information sharing between the
requester and issuer. Specifically, the cryptographic protocol
of NDNCERT can be modeled as shown in Table 2 and the
notations can be found in Table 1. From the result generated
by CPSA, we summarize that NDNCERT protocol offers
protection against attacks enumerated by CSPA because all
the possible executions are secure.
Overhead and Performance. To provide insight into the
communication and computation cost, we also measure the
packet size and different cryptographic operation time with
the C++ NDNCERT implementation. In the evaluation, we
use “/ndn” as the issuer and the requested certificate is under
the identity name “/ndn/alice”. Both the issuer’s key and
requester’s key are ECDSA keys over the prime256v1 ellip-
tic curve. The encryption scheme used in our evaluation is
AES-GCM-128. The evaluation platform is (i) a laptop with
8GB memory and 2.2GHz Quad-Core Intel Core i7 and (ii)
a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+ with 1GB memory and 1.4GHz
Cortex A53.
As indicated by the packet size results in Figure 4, NDN-
CERT does not pose high bandwidth overhead to the net-
work. Figure 5 shows the time elapse of main cryptographic
operations in the NDNCERT implementation, including In-
terest and Data packet signature generation and verification
operations, ECDH, HKDF [15], and AES GCM [21] encryp-
tion and decryption. Among these cryptographic operations,
the most time-consuming operation is signature verification,
which only takes less than 2ms on a low-power device and
is acceptable for practical use.
7.3 Trial Deployment
We have deployed an old version of NDNCERT on a single
site on the NDN testbed [20] for more than a year. A wider
deployment is still in progress and the testbed root issuer has
already been running over NDNCERT. In this section, we
first briefly introduce the hierarchical structure of certificates
on the NDN testbed and explains how NDNCERT will be
deployed to support it.
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Figure 6: Certificate Chain on the NDN Testbed
The whole testbed shares one trust anchor (i.e., “/ndn”)
and each site (e.g., participating institutions or organizations)
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owns a certificate (e.g. “/ndn/campus1”) derived from the
trust anchor certificate. Then each site uses the per-site key
to further issue certificates to users from that site. Testbed
users will be configured to trust either the testbed trust an-
chor certificate or the certificate of the local site. An example
certificate chain from user certificate to testbed anchor cer-
tificate is shown in Figure 6.
Therefore, to deploy NDNCERT, operators from different
sites can first request a certificate from the testbed root issuer,
where the identity verification challenge can be realized by
out-of-band communications (e.g., email exchange or phone
call). After that, each site can use the certified key to run
the issuer for users. Specifically, the site operator can figure
out their own form of collaboration with the local name
authority and configure their own means to verify requester
identity. To improve usability, users can still be configured to
send a certificate request to the testbed issuer and the issuer
further forwards users to different sites.
8 DISCUSSION
8.1 Lessons Learned from NDNCERT Trial
Deployment
NDNCERT has been under active research and development
since 2017 and its design has changed in significant ways
over time. We present some of the major design changes and
the lessons learned.
• Name assignment: In the previous design of NDNCERT,
a certificate issuer served as a name authority as well, as-
signing a name to a requester when it issues a certificate.
However, throughout the trial deployment, we learned that
name assignment in general requires out-of-band knowl-
edge. Our current design functionally separates name au-
thority from certificate issuer as explained in §4.
• Payload encryption: Because only public information,
such as a public key, a public-key certificate, and a random
application ID, is exchanged in NDNCERT communication,
the previous design of NDNCERT left all packet exchanges
in plain text. However, as new identity verification chal-
lenges were added into the protocol, and possible attack
scenarios were identified by the NDN team, we updated
our design to encrypt the payload by default.
Additionally, trial usage of NDNCERT also triggered dis-
cussions regarding the content of the KeyLocator field in a
packet as we explain next (§8.2).
8.2 Same Key, Multiple Certificates
By design NDN allows one public key to have multiple cer-
tificates, as reflected in the NDN certificate name §3.2: the
same issuer can create a new (renewed/revoked) version of
the certificate, and different issuers can issue certificates for
the same public key.
With the above in mind, in the current implementation,
the KeyLocator field in each signed NDN packet identifies
only the key name, leaving to the consumer to decide which
certificate to use to validate the signing key. However, trial
deployments of pilot applications exposed issues in signature
validation: although the consumer/verifier’s trust policies
(trust schemas) make the ultimate decision on acceptable
signers and should be able properly construct the name to
fetch, additional information is needed to fetch a certificate in
default cases. Specifically, when the consumer’s trust schema
does not include a certificate selection strategy, the KeyLo-
cator needs to identify a specific certificate chosen by the
producer, so that the consumer can use it for the signature
validation. If the schema specifies the strategy, then it can
simply override the certificate instance chosen by the pro-
ducer.
Although this revelation does not directly relate to the
NDNCERT design, we share this newly gained understand-
ing here with whoever may be working on NDN data verifi-
cation solutions.
8.3 Working with Name Authority for
Name Assignment
To obtain an NDN certificate, a requester and an issuer must
agree on the name of the certificate. This step requires some
collaboration between the issuer and the name authority to
determine the right name for the certificate. This collabo-
Name 
Authority
Certificate 
Requester
Certificate 
Issuer
1
3
2 3
Figure 7: Example collaborations between the certifi-
cate issuer and the name authority
ration can be achieved through different means, a typical
pattern is shown in Figure 7. A requester R first gets a name
from the name authority through an out-of-band channel
with name authority’s verification of R’s identity (➊). After
that, the name authority gives R an identity assertion (e.g.
short-lived secret code) that needs to be presented to the is-
suer later. R then runs NDNCERT client program and sends
a certificate request with the identity assertion to the issuer
(➋). The issuer can verify the assertion through direct or
indirect collaboration with the name authority (➌).
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8.4 Installation of the Trust Anchor
In order to ensure a certificate issuer is trustworthy, the trust
anchor certificate must be pre-installed into each entity via
security bootstrapping. Different application and network
scenarios can have different ways to obtain a trust anchor,
however we argue that an out-of-band channel or in-bind
channel with out-of-band information is necessary to secure
the correctness of the trust anchor information.
• Out-of-band channel: The trust anchor certificate can
be installed offline. For example, the trust anchor can be in-
stalled with the software or a local network administrator
can manually install a trust anchor for each entity.
• In-band channel with out-of-band information: A in-
band channel can be established after a verification process
that utilizing the out-of-band information. For example, in
the case of a college, students may obtain a trust anchor
certificate online after verifying the information is truly
from the college, e.g., by comparing the hash value of the
certificate with the value printed on a hard copy.
In IoT scenarios, the installation of the trust anchor can be
bundled with device’s request of name and certificate when
we discuss more about certificate management in IoT next
(§8.5).
8.5 NDN Certificate and Name
Management in Internet of Things
While the NDNCERT design considers generic use cases, in
Internet of Things (IoT) scenarios, the installation of trust
anchor, the name assignment, and the process of certificate
issuance can be bundled together for simplicity and effi-
ciency [9, 26, 30].
In such a process, based on certain out-of-band informa-
tion (e.g., QR code scanning), a mutual authentication can be
established between an IoT device with the controller who
acts as the trust anchor, the name authority proxy, and cer-
tificate issuer. After that, the device can install the local trust
anchor certificate and the controller can assign the name
with the help from the higher layer (e.g., human) and issue
the certificate for the device.
8.6 Grandchild Namespace Certificates
When a namespace owner assigns a sub-namespace to an-
other entity and issues it a certificate, the issued certificate
is a proof of the namespace ownership delegation from the
issuer to the requester. As we discussed in §4.2, NDN allows
such operation to occur recursively. This means that an en-
tity needs to set up its own certificate issuer program in
order to be able to issue sub namespace certificates.
However, an entity may not be able or willing to directly
manage the delegated namespace, either because of the lim-
ited resources (e.g., in IoT cases), the need to stay available for
the requesters, or simply because of the lack of experience to
setup the software. In these cases, we may allow “(great-
*)grandparents” to issue certificates to the sub-delegated
namespace identities, but only if this is permitted by the trust
schema rules. In other words, when the schema does not allow
such delegation, even though the certificate can be physically
issued, it will be discarded during the rule validation stage.
9 CONCLUSION
To support the ubiquitous use of public key cryptography to
secure data in NDN, this paper presented the design of NDN-
CERT to provide usable certificate management. The design
of NDNCERT is based on our latest understanding of several
key concepts and the relations among them, including name
assignment versus certificate management, authentication
versus trust, and certificate issuers versus trust anchors.
Clarification of these concepts helps us further appreciate
the fundamental differences between today’s deployed TLS
certificate management system and NDN certificate manage-
ment. The latter is established on the foundation of (i) naming
data by using the same structured, semantically meaningful
names throughout the protocol stack, (ii) clear separation
between authentication and trust, and (iii) flexible certificate
issuance ability to support least privilege principles. As a
result, NDN certificate management avoids all the issues, as
identified in §2, in today’s deployed solutions.
In addition, we recognize that NDN/ICN can facilitate
the certificate management by providing simple certificate
retrieval and high certificate availability. As future work, we
will expand the deployment of NDNCERT from the NDN
testbed into all NDN-enabled devices and applications; such
real trials will help deepen our understanding of how data-
centric security should be developed.
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